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STICTIOU IV

1.

tldDc

SCO?:E.

Org~nizrrtion

ar.d O?Crations of technical intolligcnco

mid immediately following World Wax; I I!

2.

122EOD.

This hundred £.nd ton ( 110) minute ~)oriod o:f ir..str'_,_ctior

Sa bcld e.s a co::Ueroncc during '1hich quo st ions i:'ro put to tho

cla~s .:ind

a p14od discussion is C·:Jnductod by the iastructor.
This is a hundred and ton (110) minute confo1-

._with time utilized

appro:xif1E~toly

c.s follows:

a..

Intr6.duction-------------------.:_______________

b.

Tochnic~l

6 1.riinutos.

Intelligence c.t the beginning cf

l!orld War II -------:--------------------- 8

rc:i:1~tcs.

c.

The :Vcvolopmcnt of U.S. Tochr~.icc_l Intollit;cncc-· 16 .o.·L:utcs.

d.

Tochnicf'_l

c.

:Bred::---.... ------------------------------------ 10 ninutcs.

f.

E£:rl:;,.· Tccl-i....."lical Intclli{soncc .nctivitio3 i:.1 tho

I~"!.tolligc:1cc

in tho :Li'I10------------ 20 minutes.

Pacific--------------------------------- 10 mi::."lutc s.
:;.

Cor.~:!.Jnny----

12 .ruinntos •

..C oordinct ion-----------

5 minutes.

Tho 5250th Tochnicc.l Intolligonco

h.

T9chJ."1icc~l

1.

Technical Intolligonco Cvo~~ticns in tho

In tclligoncc

PhillipL~e~~--~~----~------------------

10 minutes.

j.

2cchniccl Intolligonco in the Post 1·Tc.r Poriod-

8 minutes.

k.

Su.m.'11£'.r~r-------------------------------------

5 minu.tos.

110 minutGs.

TOT..sL

4.

do\orioa

INT".aODUCTIOiT
h~vo

( 6 minutes).

[\...

All through tho history of wa.r,

b.:::on crodi tod to the introduction o:f u :aow weapon or n now

'-t1oal system built around \·1c:cpons.

In turn cnch :r:.ow

\·JCE'..pon

hc.s produce(

& ooaDterweopon that terapor~ily D.l torcd tho bnlL-nCe Of :qower in :fcvor of

one nation.

3
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"J.

The dominv.nce of the cromon ovor tho city

l'flQltod in tho first gcncrc.l

c~rnhange

of rcsidon t

G"1d

cc.stlo vrnll

aobc~ssri.dors.

tlao nood for r:ccurv..to Md ti!aoly informntion of tho wcet!_:>ons of v..
;'IOtllCf wr.s felt onrly in wcstc;rn histor;~r.

Tho tcclmic;::l

~l:us

fcre:!.gn

intcll~t;cnco

con-

tl.ctod by these l'lilbn.ssr.dors \·ms furnished the crnftsmr·n of tho cti.:mon
toa:Ddrioa to produce

P

bettor gun Md to tho engineer who rcclcs:i.e;ned

ti10

at: vclls to minioiza tho effect of tho noighborbg kingdon,' s cnru:on$
Al th'.Jugh tochnicnl E'.nd. scientific intollibonce hr'.VO boon conducted

b eo:io foro throughout history, it wns not '...mtil rocont tir.1os thrct sys...

tea end crgmizdion wore introduced.

.A.'1 org['nj_zrtion for technico.l

1:.to!ligonco i!l tho U. S, .Axr:ry wns first dovolopod during World 1fr.r I+.
c.

Tochnicnl intelligence. is dofiri.. ed

LS

intelligence pcrtdn-

bc to the principles of dosir;n ru·id 'oporrttio:1, norJonclr.turc, phynic2l
ebnr.ctoristics Dnd

In c

bro~,dor

~1orforoC'ncc

of r:1c.torial used by foreign nrr.10d forces.

sense, tcchnicel intelligence nl"'.y rlso onbrl'.ce the Dcnu-

fccturc. r;tor:,go, instcllution, 09orl'.tion, c.r.d

r.J.ri.i~1tcno.nco

of foreign

at.tericl r.r. well ns tho nntu..ro, orgpJ1izntion, r,nd ftctivitios of the
rcencios u;d instollo.tions in fproign grou:1d forces hnvini:; functions
=al(){;ous t:J those of the teclmicri services in tho lTni tod St t..'tos 1,.rr.rytt
P.roporly,

u!.r.8

~·~c'micnl

intclliJ;o::.1cc is dori vod from nl:'.torinl i ssucd to tho

trovpu ·.:hilo scientific intcl.lic;onco is dori vod <'.t i:my st ego of

tlonlop!Jcr.t.
tcahnicrl

\•To hr.vc discussed in n previous clnss tho rclr'tionship of

in~;Jlligcnco

d.
pnoo durir-6

to combr,t intollic;cnco i:>nd strdegic L;.telliaonco.

In our discussion of tho dovolopnont of tochnicnl intolli~iorld

Wur II,

~·cu.

should keep 111 nind how well tho orgv.r.. ize-

t1cm JlOt tho needs of tho four objectives of technical intelligence.
o.

QU:ESTIOlT:

;mswor:

W'!lnT .fu-:uJ THE ]!"'CUR G3J:JC 1.dV:::S OF 'I'EC~HCJJ..

( 1)

Pror.1pt dovclopnent of colmtor::lc['.surc:s Dnd

colUltor tnct ics.
4
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o\m bencfi t.
resources

tw.toriDl.
uinu .
4 lforld ll:::r II \·1i thout vn oitho

~'ol'.I's

just prior to

iocbntcnl rnd scientific intelligence•

'tri771 {r;· ~ mlltr.ry c.ttr.C:10 s, hru.1perod by [\ lr:ck of fi;.n(
tllltlit• tntollit;onco 1.nfornction in forei<;n countries.
1

J:::':Rl.i.:Jf lli':i'ORT 0?.G.l!!Z.:::!l?
.~,- ZllAlO GorL:ans or.:;r11ized

fJ..t .,noo ~tcd by

1e tcch.'1icl'.l intellibonco service in the nn.ied

.

~

·,_.

~'lct''au;>rort

v. ndi.onl'.l scientific doveloF

wee rondored by tl:o :.nd.u.strinlists Hho h[l(l esto.b~hroU(;h the ct•rtcl s;,rsten they wer'

UlllioC or::rtola 1.:: t:Oc ecru.,· thirtios.

ftlalo to obtdn.!orci.::;n dcwolo;.me;1ts,. 'such r.s circrc.ft instru1.1ents, c;1d c.t
·.... lllGD \Sao-doey forci.;n powers inforr.1ntion tl1ron,:;h tl1eir potor.t contro:

.. uaov oontrol of

intorchm1.:;c of industric.l infornntion, pc.rticulrxl;,;

la \ZIO ohoo!c:-l ir.ductry.
d.

Tn;;t:;-'.1ctor · Cor.c,ent:

Spain wc.s used ns a testing i:;round by

t:. Oorar.ne !or tho fruits of the scientific dcvelopr.iont we hrvc juot

'1ec.asod. lihilo they lorrncd nuch c.bout such weapons ns the Soviet 45L12
•

p , tho;y nr.nr.:;od to test their own 88nn duol purpose t:,'lm, concenlin,;

1'1 anUtr.nk Cl'.pn'bilitics fron the obscrYors of other notions.

WO

m

mm:5

S':i:J.!lUS OF TI:CIDTIC;J.. .hlifD SCIENTIFIC IETELLIG:2ITCJJ
ON 7 DECZ!·Jl.ER 1941?

5

r~

,, <\

·~

.~} ··!·.·.1

r·
1. ·::.

:~

~:

.:·;:; , :~
~.

·- .J

~·\
.. ·

j

rn

THE mn~

:".'1?

rJ{,
~:

c~

!(: .

r«:.::

d

w '.:.

ij

We hl'.d forned the Nntioncl Defense Rosecrcl1

Cor..ni ttee in 1940 which becnne the Office of Scientific Rese!'.rch cr..d DeveloprJer~t

in 1941.

intellibonce
probl"r>n.

Ench of our siz techniccl services in t::.e .P..ruy hnd

orti!'niz~tion

ccpnble of only lioited

~up~o~t

l\."1

tG n develap8cnt

Thero wns no fiold orgcnizntion to collect infornC'.tion other thon

the t:'.ttnches.
f.

QUES?IOU:

FROM lvtli..T SOURC!l DID lC D:2PJv.J '11!:!0?.lTIC.f.L

G:EJ:TCIJ DU!lDTG TB2l nHn.i.L PH.ASE OF THE W,AP. i..G.t..IlrST

Answer:
6.

G~H;JTY?

MI-10, tho J3ri tish tochnicfl.l intellicanco ecency.

Tl8 DlJV'Z10Pi.IPTI~ OF
[\•

I~~TJJLLI-

u.s.

TECHHIC.tJ.i IHZJL1'IG:JlmE

(16 ninutos).

i.lthout;h we hc.vo worked in close ccoporn-

Instructor Conncnt:

tion with the British- since 1942, we soon ror-.lized th:ct to noet ccrtr.in
needs of our own

l'.

tochnictl intclliGo!!ce ort;['nizl'.tion was nocessr.ry.

ACcordint;ly tho scrviCos 1 fUJ.""lctions in t ccbnicc.l intclliconco woro plc.cod
under G2 i.rny Service l?orcos rnd \frr Dop&tnont technical intolliconco uns
ch<:>rced to t:io Hili tl'.l'~' Intclli:;cnco Sorvico of tho Gc11cr£1l Ste.ff.

i3quipr.1Cnt Intolli[:;cr.co Service Tc[lnS (:EEIS TcruJs) were fornod.

:Enony

They voriod

in size but wore coni1osod initinlly of personnel fron sever1:'.l services.

?hose teens 11oro first onployed in 1'7or'th .Africn.
b.

Q.U:::STIOlT:
A~swor:

·(l)

Wii.,.,T i'/.ZRD TruJ DD"J.lIJS OF TH:J :GDIS T1JJ.j11S?

They hnd four duties:

To gather onony cquipnont for study.

(2)

To exminc enony :,?reduction facilities nftor cr.pturc.

( 3)

To question and

oX<'.!.1inO

oncn;:r production experts uhon

captured.
(4)

To detcrnino faults thc:..t vppearod in our own oquipnc::it

under conbnt conditions.

AF::l!C.A COl\SIDERED A SUCC3SS?

6

,·-> -=..--,
'...

r- ~l
(...

...

/~ :.--:- , ~

..;

__,,'_,

: :~

:)
Uu

~:

~ fr=~ cyl? !;~

(0 C"j?

(J il

I'

\ !J ' ::.-::;:;

f\·j

U L, t! ;'

Tho IBIS Toru.1s provided prncticclly no infornc.tion

or intcllie;cnco for cor.1bl'.t uni ts in Horth Africn.

prinrxily b

Since their interest we c

collection rui.d cvucuntion, lLTGe er.wunts of ill nssortod

r...-;tcriol wc.s sent to the United Stntos.

Ono result wes thc.t the .British

;II.. lQ who were providi:r.t; intclliccncc to British [',lld US co1Jor.t troops were

ur...:blo to collect D['.tericl.

Ino:::q>oricncc resulted in poor collection P.nd

~r:ioti.;.1t

,roccssinG dosp 1 to tho

of :-.w.tericl {'.Vnilr.blc.

OBG.iJTIZ.AT:mr FOR t'l& D]IP..'.?.i1i:81'1'.i: ncmTICJ.1
~:

Gonce activities in n

I~.

IlJT3LLIGE1~CI;

rn 1944?

Juri.e 1944 HIS conccntu.tod. its tcclmicnl intelli-

si~lo

·section cr.llcd the IJJ:ilitc.ry Rescnrch Section,

liilitnry :Srench.

c.

Instructor Co::ingnt:

':1his sect.ion uus chpr,,::;od with the propar~

tion of conplctc, uccurato, t:clld tincly intollit;oncc on onony technical sub-

jocts includin:;:

sr.:nll

c:\l'DS

nnd nortc.rs; artillery c,.'1d fire control; vJ.1i.!U!li·

tion; rockets nnd G,uidod Lissilos; encinecr

<:~d

ir:.d.ividur.1 equipnont; 1ll1.i-

for:.:s nnd insiG!lin; fortificntions cn1d defense; lot:;istics.

With t:1is chruice in

orG~:111iZf1.tion r~t

bined Chiefs of Stoff issuod

l'.

the \frr Depr,rtrnnt level, tho Corr•

directive stcting thnt tho nost inportmt

uso of cnor:iy cqu.ipnent wc.s for intcEi;;cnce 1mrposos.
now been ll:'..id for

~n

~ho c,Tot..:.1dwork

efficient tcch..-:icd intolliz;oncc effort.

hm

.As n result

of this dircctivq tho Wc~r Dap£'.l'tncnt issued circulrx 160 which cstnblishcd
priori ties for tho uso of cneEy

Answer:

(1)

rn:~tcrial.

Intelligence rcquironcnts of United States nnd

Allied Governnents.

(2)

Oporntioncl nnd trv.inint; re~uirenents within the

thec.ter where cr.ptured.
( 3)

Trnininc; req_uironents for troops in the United Stntes

end for oversens US cocnnr..ds.
7
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(4)

3.eq_uirencnts for displeys for purposes s»ich t·s ir:C.t'.strL.1
incentive, wnr nD.npower recruiting, or

:1ent.

IHTELLIG::JlIC:

coordinntion l'.nd :.:1riori ty tnrcots wore l'.ssiGned fror.1 tho Hr.r Dope.rtTeru.;s

cneny

bond pror:otior:.

They 01.1cr[·t0d under HIS' control out of tl1crtcr love:.:-

.Answer:
~nor~l

TI:C~INICJ:.L

.b.FTEP. JUNE 1944, Em·r DID

QU-.JSTIOU:

w<>I

O~?orrtocl

nr~tcriecl

with .Arny, Corps, c.ncl Division \·rhoro

tho~'

collected

:for otu.d.y •

.hnswcr:

Cr._pti.:.rcd nr-.terfo.l wr.s e·:ncunted throuch :m9ply Md

service channels to thor'tcr \·.here it wr::.s.

s~}.ippod

to t.he o.p:,)roprio.to test

end annlysis instclle.tion c.;cr.crr.ll~r in t:1c Zeno nf Interior •

..Ar..a.l:ml::

t~1rouc;h

Reports were f onu:-rclod

tcclmic['l service

cha"lr.els to the Chief of the technice.l service on tl1c 1;c.r Dopert:.;ont level.

Vitd inforn.:>ti'.)r>. ~cid intollic;onco wns fnrnishod tho G2/S2 r.t tho opordin,--:
level of the tec..D.

This rosul tad in tcchr:.icr.1 intcJ.lir;e::i.cc boccni::i:;

LV8.il-

r.ble for conbd intcllit;cacc purposes both ns spot rc:ports in conb2t r;.1d ns

finished studios di sser.:inc.ted to the troops;
7.
~:

T1JCffiTIC.i.L Ill'.I1ZLLIG:C:.iCE IH TIC E~O

(20 c.inutcs).

llhile ·1·if'.r Do:1c:rt;1o:it toclmicd intollibcr.ce

1:ff.S

Instru.ctor
bcin{; orgmizocl

as n result of the o::p<;rior.co .:;f'incd in Horth .Africn clwnces wore being
onde nt the operf'.ting level patly becf'..usc of cllcnces v.t t:10 Wo..r De:1n:rt-

r.cnt level end pr.rtly bccnu.se of

e::~1crienco

ste.ffs nnd troops prepf'.rinG for tho

::,;uinod by the

Horr.:ar.d~r

invr.sion.

conr.~mdors,

Perhc;;in t!1e clc[':l"-

est exf'.nplos of the orGMizf'.tionnl trend c.re t::.o Gteps that led to the
fornc:>.tion of Enc;ineer Tcchrdcl'.l IntolliGonce Tec.I.1S •
. b.
S':.~:'

QUESTIOH;

OFFICERS TP'....AT

WE.t.T COiffi ITIOH COUVEC::ID cor.rr.;.;.1m2s iJ:ID

:EHGii~

T3CH1JICJ..1

IHTZLLIGI:".D~C3

··-:-, :=•
'_-,
\....

\.·

...

.--....

l

l~::C:CSS.c..3.Y?

!-148F-51

8

:.:

-I'FJ:.HS W31IB
..

E:.IGEG-:~

.,

·:·~

:·-.

-J

!
.J

,-·-,

-' :'.

L -·

'
1

I

•

n r/
J

Answer:

·:.:·~

';('

\0

[fl

u i_:~--~

r:- , ._.

~_J}

For nore thL'.n six nonths of tho .b:friccn Md

Itr-~licn

crnp<'.ic;ns, uni ts were reportinG on encny nine ns v.. new nine wl!cn the f.line
hnd dre.-..dy been oncou.ntcrou by cnothor U.."lit.

This lC\ck of pronpt ·diszc-

nin.::-.tion resulted in needless loss of lj.fc, oquiimont, nnd tine.
Instructor Con;-;cnt:

c.

To correct the si tua.tion c. study wc.s

nroc betl10cn .bucust 1943 r!1d J nnuciry 1944 by tl:c Office of Chief of :En-

cineors.
ocnt

\·l[\S

..A cor.::;loto file of o:dstil1.G i:nforr.:ntion on cneny oncinecr equipsot u.p in t!1e :tntclliconce Division OC::J in t:!.1e United :anGdon.

b1lothor result of tho study, t·r[·.s the forrn:~tion of two (2) E.csenrch rond
nine ( 9) Conbn.t

Te<ns .fron v:oluntcors in UK 3.cinforccncnt

Zncinccr Uai ts in ti10 thoctcr.

Dc::_)ots

end

Tho tcvns went into trdni!1G in Hm-ch

1944 i.•li th tho Intollir;onco Dhrision OC2 in tho Uni tee_

Ki~v~don ~id

r.vt:.il£,blo to P.cconpmi.y :First i-.rr..y in lfor;-:·;ru1dy 1 o.tc in Ju.no.

\·JOro

One rcseo.rch

tcnn .::nd throo co:ibc.t tol'.l1s, oD.e for er-.ch of tho cor]?s, worked with First
J..rny.

~heir o..-:rl:r and spo.ctc.cul.:-...r ~uccosa ( r\!:. c::c-:1plo of l:hich wo will

disc1u::s in n ll'tor c1~ss) led fine1ly to tho rctivntioE of five (5)

rcsccrch teens and eleven (11) conbat teans •

.Ar~s'.ver:

m:.d infornntion c.bout

T~10

tct.:~s

st~_ch

\·1oulcl

~olloct

oquip;-:1cnt, :'.11.d

encny m1t;inocr Gqui:i.Jnent

dissu.:inr~te

the do.tn c.nd nntoricJ.

c.s c_:.nickly ns possi blc, when of ir.ii:1cdir:ta i.oportl"nce, to tho conbc.t troops.
:1he infornntion r'..'1d rmtcriEl was sent to the zone of interior for rcEccrch

rui.d nnnlysis.
uith

t~get

The fliIS orcnnizt'..tion nt thontcr level provided the teru1s
De}?~tnent

infornntion nnd Wnr

collecti0n inforD".tion tJ:-;..ro1JGh.

the Thef'.ter Chief Er.t;ineer.

e.

Instructor Cor:ment:

tenr1s ui th sinilm- functions.

The other services orgt.nized siuilur

But throUGhout the cc-.r:r')D-iCn there W2"S li t«::lo

crordin['.tion rnor..(; the te0Js otl1or thi'n infornnl nrrr'ncenc!lts ur;d.e by tern

cornJr-.ndors.

In nMy cnsos the nssi st€".ri.Cc t !:..ey rece ivod fron the G2/S2s W<'.c

dependent upon the friendly rolv.tions ostr.blis!1cd by tho

9

t0DL1
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cc!:U:l!'ndors.

Friendly relr.tions uoro

ost.~blished

by

dcoonstrr.tin(~

to t::o trc·O)S thr.t

tcchnicnl intollicence provided inr:edir.to "bcncfi ts to tho crJnbd troops.
I:ic opcro.tions of n sirv:;lo

Ord~1c.:.1co

Teclmicv.1 Intclliccc1co ':orI.: in
(l~~cr-;_plos.

liornmcly provides us '!:li th tuo excellent
( 1)

J;n nrnorocl division h<'..d.

of s·ocinc 75:-m .EP

tho cLishonrtcc1iac cxporionco

N!!tu.ni ti on

of t!-.o !·fork VI Ticer Tcni:s.

b::ii.'.ncc off the

fror~t

plc.to

Tho O::..·d..'1r.i1Cc tcPf.1 dcr.:ionstrt

ted on n co.pturcc1 Hrrk VI t:1c.t 75nn 12 would.

pcnotrr~te

tl:e rclctivol;• tl:L1 side c.rnor c,t r..or:-:f'l conbr>.t r['.nces.
Pq-nctrr.tion cnrds, shov1inc.; on. a,_ silhouette, tho poi1::..·l; of

cwi~crs.

~he results

of t::o tests \'JCro forwardorl ·t:1rr1i.-::

G2 ai:d Ord.11enco char..nels to the 1-.1m- Dopr:rtnent .:-11C:. tho
te.nkers stc.rtec.1 lm0ckinr, out

(2)

~ic;crs.

1he 30th Ir.fc.ntry DivisL;n found in lforec.ndy t:1c..t tl:e
sup~;ly

of

sub:.:nc:~i:1e

]e.trollinc;.

:_,1ms rto~·:horo : :et t:i.o dern.nds of

'.i?hcy hc.d soon Md

borno l1c.d lost non to
to

~le.ad. ~10N

11 frion0.l~r 11

tho 82nd.

...:.ir-

fire when rn ri,t tor.:iJt

cc.:_ntn.rcd ll'40. ":Buxp" i:;i.ms hc.d fpilccl boc::tuso of

USG·

tho c::c.rc.cteristic s0und ·'.)f the ":Sux::,)11 £).1...'1•

Tl10 Ord-

nc!l0c Tcc~rr:.icc.l Intollic.;c!'.'lcc Teru.1, ex:;;ort::i in sr.:dl r1.r;.:~

nodi:;iod cc.ptt:.red. U?40s by drill.inc; n hole in tho bolt

wl1ich wr.s filled
t~18t

t:10

11 :Burp 11

\'Ii th

lcD.d, slo,·tirr.:; t:10 cyclic re.to so

GU11 snnndod lilrn t~10 US IiI Thorr:ison.

11

French bicycle stop produced c. thousc.ncl_ nodificd ions in
ci.

wccl':.

Ordnv.nco rrchivos incUcnte the splendid. S'..'..F•iort

of technicnl intolligonce rctivi tios fron thd division

durbc; the renc.indor of tho wrx.
f.

C.:,u:JSTIOU:

•.:..FT::;.~ illCHHICiJ., IKT3LLlGR'.CE .t>SSI STiJJC:E PROVIDZ:

Tml lT.JCilS:32Y IH'T3LLIG::Jl;cn, HOW Ui.S C.t.P'l'lJ:IJD lL:.'.l.·2!..nL US:J) :BY CUB. TR.CC:!? s
.t.G~IlTS11

THil G::rRl·i...ir5?
10
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.?.nswer:
19~1-,

During tho ra-t i llo:..y mu:iu.ni ti on she> rt <";CC in ln to

cv..pturcd Q.UlS were turned on the Gcr.:Juns incluclinc tho fu10us 88.

In Itl'.ly, Ordnance, usinc .br:lnunition Intorch::.nc;oc-.bility Dl'.tc p:-cpc.roc1 by

;cchnic<;l IntolliGencc, were ublc to issue !tr.lien l'.nd
~urd tion.

11r~5nillG

Gor~1r:n

8lru.1 nortr:.r

litcr<'.turo producoc1 by Sit;ncJ. Tcc::nicl':l Intclliccncc

enc.bled US forces to use q_uo.nti tics of cc:;?turod field telephone oquiJ::-iont •

Cc.pturcd nctcri C'.1 i.·1onlc1.. -oc cv<cu.:.tod o.s rc.pidly c.s

.b.ns·wor:

·-·
possible to tho Unitcd.Kin:;c1or: for test

::.net ['...'1[1.l;>'sis by the :British toclu:i

cr.1 intclli(;onco ::;:;ency.

:1.

Q,U:JSTION:

H'EY U.hS TlG D:;jC ISIOlJ T'J ccn:rr;cT T:;jSCi:

ew

J..nsv:cr:. F·c.cilitics c::dsted in
neccssnr~r

D':~

_',lill ...:u.L YSI s

to c:mclact t!::.c

test <'.nd f'.nclysis c.nd ta forvic.rd tho results t:1rau.Gl1 tocl:niccl

r.nd intcllic;cncG

c~1r~nriols

to the troo)s on

t~:o

cant iaont ia c. netter of

drys.

...lw§~Q..~:

<nd r>nclysis ns well

SL'.n:1los were cvc.cu::-to(.l' to the US for c1.ot.'.'.ilcd to st
~s ro~}orts

of tl10 tc_sts ;1.:-.dc in t!10 l1K sent to the

tec:micPl service conccracd in tho US.
j.

Instructor Con:-:ont:

hl'.d a i')roductive ort;[l.l!izc.tion for
wcolmesses in the

orc~&'1iZL'.tion

By tho close of t~10 w<1.. in Eur.ope wo
teclmicc~l

i::.1tGllicencc.

There wore

v1hich woulc1 be stuclied, but the objectives

end genercl. ::_Jrinciples of n techniccl intelli:;er.ce effort had been
estD.blishoc1.

G.

EF..:J.LK

(10 ninutcs).

( 10 oinu tes).

11
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-~···,

·~ c:;p
LI

.::!J

fl.

I_

structor Cor.lncnt:

P:

fl

,,p;;.

u "' u '~-,--="'

Froe the opcninc o:f tho Pl'.cific Wr:.r

until FovoGbor 1942, there was little tochnicnl intclliccnco cctivity in
the Southi1ost Pnci:fic l...rct:'..

Sonc si:m.11 cxns, r-.r:ira.:t..'1.i ti on, tend n few i ter.:s

of Chcnicr:l Warfnrc cquipncnt wo!'c t't:'i..r:1ed over to Orc1..ncnco and Cl:..enico.l
Wrrf.::.rc of:ficors for cxE>nin::-.tion.

No orcnnizod c:.ttorr;.')t wns no.de to ht·.ve

technical intcllic:oncc cr>..rriocl into tho field by n tocn o:f non skilled
1:1 colloctinc nnd o.nnlyzinc cnr.>turcd mi.cny cquipncnt.

b.

4-S Il:T 1TG1lCF:L:: WE P.:JLI3D u?OH OUR .h.LLI:::S

QU2S'.L'IOH:

Answer:

r:::r:iL0..LY.

:Both J.ncricc11 end J1ustrc.lif'.ll for cos avc.cuc.tcd

ot:toric.l to Lf'.nd Hor-_dquc.rtcrs, .b.ustrnlir>.n_ i,:r.ny in .h.ustrnlir>.. whore dotnilod
test nnd Dnr'..lysis was nc:-,do by ""ustrc.linn tcc!.micnl c::.;:ports.
chmncl of ovo.cuc.tion was .b.ustrnlinn.

Tho entire

In c.ddition tho .Austrr·.linns holrJcd

trr.in our toclmicnl intcllfr;cncc personnel, with the aid of en c::tonsivo
collection of cc_pturcd equipnent.

For the re.maind.er of' the wc:r wo w arkcd

in close r:nd profitable cooperation.

c.

Q,U-.CSTIOU:

013.CW.ul..R :CS'i.1.;..BLIS-..:rf1D -.6.

.A!l§!t.0.z:

ao?.:J

Ti~c

~

CLOS:JLY

I'JJI~

COiTTROL P03. PRCG:JSSU'.G CJJ?-

flow of r:o.torinl wns fron conbnt

troo~_)S

to

service troops in tho cor:.bnt zono, throueh norrml recovery chonnols 11 to
tho l1hcl".tcr Special Stci.f'f oi'ficor of t:10 C.l)!>ropri:'..te service, whore a

prcli.ninnry expert nnnlysis wns :-.1c,G.o boforo

t~:o

r.w.torinl wns forwl'.rdod

to the chief of the service in tho United Str-.tos.
wer~t

Hnlf of tho notarial

to the United Stntcs and h<:'..lf to .Austrnilin for test nr.d .::..n"-.lysis

by Austro.lion Forces.

d.

Instructor Connont:

Thcv.tor s:,ocinl staff" o:fficors wore

responsible for prcliuinnry o:qJort ru1r-.ly£is fron which they ;:r:do

12
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?rclininc.ry deductions c.s to the stf'.te of enony re sources for war.

They

tlso wore responsible £or prclininnry opcrntion a.'1.d nnintcnrmcc instructions ['Jl.d instructions for locn.l n0dificntions to pcrnit the use of C["p-

tu.reel i"J['_tcric.l by cur own troops.

~s

cm-ly, t!lon 9

ns 1fovcnbcr

19,~

pl['Jl.s

'llcrc bcinG r:ndc to o.ccor::plish the objectives of tcchnicc.l intclliccncc.

o.

Q.UESC' I ON:
In£oruntionnl ro}_-.iorts on '1[".tori::'.l ::_Jc.ssecl throU[;h

Jfilswcr:

chr-nnols :fro.D conbr..t troops to S2 or G2. then to G2 GHC'4

ncnt, ns well ns boinc

intcrc~'lnncod

to tho Wro-

Dop.'.:'r-:.~

cL1onc the service troo!)s hnndling the

ur.teri [':.l.

f.
OPIT'~ IlTG IlT T!-~ F I:JLD

lu'lswcl:!:

J...T THIS :'HO?

Uo.

Instructor Con11ont:

in the thco.tcr,

l"'.n

in Dcconber 19•12.

ordnf'.llco
S~nco

c~rou~

Tl1.e first.

tcchnico_l intolliconce unit

:fron the Uni tcct St[l.tc s, boccn oporc..tior.

its orcl'.nizc..ti c)n o.ncl c:::.-r:sol'.!_1-:cnt oporl'.t ionnl tech-

niq_uGs sot tho j_)Pttcrn l.hter followod for other uni ts in the Pucific, '"e
should discu.ss its orcnnizntion.

An.f:-Lt.,:1:!
( l)

. The teen was diviclod into throe sections:

,h.dr:j nistrL'.tiv-c Section,

vision, reports,

(2)

Field Tec.:1s,

responsible for ccnoral supc:r-

E'..ild linison with other intclliconcc

operntin::; with te:.sk forces, divisions,

or corps, collected DC'.tcrinl ['lnd citcr

ncJ.~inc i_)TC-

lininory reports shipped the untericl to t:-1e v.nclysis

section.

(3)

Tho .Annl.ysis Section, nnnlyzed the DE>.terial received
fron field

toC'J~1s,

nado reports. end then

s~ipped

nntorinl to the United Stutes.

13
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the

i.

Q,tnJS'.i'ICH:

.bnswcr:
.:n0ricf'n officers nnd
tccl~nicnl

10.

IlT ii.LY 1943, CG CF

mn~ ST.~S

Tho boc.rd wus conposcd of tt10 ..:.ustrnlir:r. n.'1d two
r;

lfo.vrtl officer who clctcrnincd on tho bnsis of

needs whore r.:l".toricl

Wr'.S

to bo procc:::socl for test l"!l.d cnnlysis.

Z-till 5250th T:SCf-:.iIC.b.L INT3LLIGE1JC:C COl·il?ll:rY

stmctor Co!'l.:.!ont:

( 12 r.:inutos) •

o.

ln=.

Tcchnicd intcllir;cnco o::icrdions in tllo Southwest

Pncific .Aron hnc., untH 19·1.3, Ocon Cl".rriod on

staff scctio:is

iJU.Y s::::;:=:VIC:DS

0~1erntine

b~r c~ctech:-1cnts

of speci!i.l

1J.ndcr vnryinc nrrcnc;or:onts in rcgr'.rd to the

nssicnncnt of pors::>nnel flnd the SU}Jervision of P.ctivities.

Only Ord11a1co

rnd Chenicl'.l ilc.rft'rc hc.d o:porr.tccl trl".inocl tof'ns of spocinlists in the fie:
ilhile n systcn of ov!'.ct1dion <:,11d rcportinc ::nC.. been estublishccl

or

the i'lr.r

Departuent in Hovenbor i9i12, m1d n contr;:'.lized cc.i_Jturcd oncny cquip.oont

depot E!lld n bonrd to control the flow of material between the allies by
~hot.tel'

in Mv..,v 1943 1 there was no coordinated effort to collect material

in the field thr0uc!1 the use of trnincd s:pociPlists •

..CTIVITIES WZP..B II8I3G_.,T:::l) '.[0 UlrIT.3D ST.tJ:3S &';;.::I SERVIC3S 0::., SUPPLY (USASOS

.An~•.Q;~:

:nc 5250th Tochnicd Intellicenco ConIJf'..!1J coqjJosod.

of six tcclmicnl scrv::.cos nad n controllirie hcpdquurtcrs wns forncdo

OF .A COHPJi.HY OF TI'.:IS TYPE?

hnswer:

F or operetions in tho Pacific this orgl".llization

pernitted.:

( 1)

A group inc of spec iv.lists fron six tochnicd servicos
with the possibility of coordin::;tcd effort nr-10!¥; then.

(2)

.ii specific table of orennizntion r:nd equipncnt to

fncilitnte field. operutions.

14
';.
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11 .,:,.

i.J

(3)

ft"' ~ s;=i ()
r

LC~

~:_...I

Li

~! '._:,.

fl

...~...;..

Li (~o:::>

!!

t-.~

f;}J
L_-..r

•:
t.)

Flexible opor,c.tion and novcncnt in the vr'cst dist.rmccs
o:f tho Pnci:f'ic rcsultinc in a nore diversified encl
conplcto cnveroge.

( ...1)

Ro.:picl disscr1inc.tion of tochnicnl. intclliccnco l'.:nd
infcrac. tion throui_'7;!l cro't.1.pod onulysis sections.

(5)

Control. o:nd clistributicn of c0.pturod onony cquipDcnt
by c. ccntrul cecncy to neat tho trD.ining Pnd tcclmicc.1.

needs of tho Theo.tor nnd tho Zono of tho Intcricr.
(6)

Fornl:'.tion of wolJ_ trninod to£1ns for field cxploitc.tior:
ir... nJ:.1phi bous wcr.

c1.

Q!J:::JST I CU:

.L.nsrwcr:
( l)

.b.ssicnod. nissiorl.s wore:

T'o cv['.ltw.tc nl:l c.Ycilrblc oncny nl'.tcrinl, l'.lld f'ror.1

such· cvclu.r-_tion to c1-ccluco the stnte of onony resm..i.rc.;:;c
fo1.. wrx,

to affect t !lo pronpt

dovelopi~1ont

o:f counter

woe.pons end COl.-"'ritcr tcctics,, c-.rid to ox:.;.>loi t

new ideo.s

:fer our bc:-tofit.

(2)

~o provide pronpti'y J.i tort'.turo~

m;:poricncoc1 personnel,

· · C-Tlc1- other t'.ids which woulcl l"'..Ssist in tho tr::-.i:nine of

c_-.Jops in tho. Thontor ri.nd in tho Zone of the Intcri'.)r
i1i..

(3)

the use nnd

ncintcn~nco

of' oncny oquipnont.

~'!) supervise tl-io retention or disposition of" anony
r~ui::.oril":.l. by

nilitn:ry

org~nizo.tions

or individu.a1s.

thereby nssurinc; the supp1y of v.11 avnill:'.b1c i tens

which would assist Tecli..nicnl IntolliGcnco personnel
in tho fuJ.fillnont of tho

a.

QtJ:@STIOJJ:

Im11 1'lAS T:::z: 5250th

~ssicncd
TSC:trl.UC~L

objective.
IlT'EJLLIGEl:TC:@

COHPJJ:TY ORG.AiUZZD TO .ACCOMJ?Lisrr T:FIS EISSIOlT?

M,swor:

Tho co.nprny wr.s cor.~po sod. of" a

coordinution ond

ndninistration section. and n tcc::inicnl section for cnch
nojor services.

15

o~

the six

f.

Jfote to Instructor:

Dis:9lny Ch.."'.l't I-2906-1 ttorgn:1iznti>:m

of 5250th Tech'1ical
..
Intclli:;encc Con9ruzyl'.

?4,AKTITG US:S OF THIS CH.i2T :ID>L.t.TIT

~'8

0::'.G.blTIZaIOlT

...IID FUHCTIOUS OP THE '.!::ECHHICJ!.L SiJCTIOHS.

At1swer:

]l{lch technical sect ion, conposed of leborntory md

cncDy cq_uipnont intcllieonco service toL'.ns, c:.}er~.tcd U...'1.dcr the technicnl

supervision of its Chief of Service rind u:1c1er ti:c ::;c:1crv.l (direct) stt~_Jor--·
vision o:f the AC of

s,. G2,

Uni tod Stet es i.rny Services of Supply..

The

lnboratory fm1ctions of test r-!l.d anal:i•sis c.nd reports were hnncUod by
tho .Ac1.ni11istrntivo u,i:i.it of, on~1 section nr.d collection c;ad reports fron
the field. by the Fiolc1 Unit.

lll1swcr:

Tho conpcny cou:.1.:ndcr w:-.s cor.1:-.1r:ncUnc officer of

the cor.1pnny r:r..d. noted .. ns G2 Toct:.nicnl Intclliccncc CoorcUn~-.tor in t~1e
Office of J£J of S, G2, USbsOS.

~1J,P::t£!::

concluct

lidsoi;~ ;rl.

One officer wns, on dut;y wi fa

::;L EIS £1.nc1.. one officer on

i~uty

~C

in

s,

of
c~ch

G2 to

Chief of

Scrvico 1 s officl,, ;;:. e.cconplish this dt1ty.
j.

QU::s~:.:ou:

ifiJ-.T PROVISIOl: \h.S l~.:n:: £0 ?:::OC:JSS IZEI-lS CF

under su9ervision of' the Chief, %l'.rtcrnl:'.stcr ...:.nnlysis Section.

Eere

cr.pturod oquipnont wns received, clz.".ssified, roc':'rdecl and delivered to
the e.pproprido service cs directed by the ii.Hied Cn.)tured Ener.:y :Dquip-

nent Bar.rd.

JJID nmrvIDU.ALS nr 'l!Hil COMBAT FORCES :BY TH:D CJ-i.PTUF:ZD Elf.DkY EQ,uI?MJl.'!'~
DEPOT.

WEY!
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nf~'> ~;r Lr,:~..

rG·

·,;.:. U

u·-~

··.fl

u

J

Tho return o:f certain i tcr_-.s to the ca:_;t*.irinc ·. ud "!;

J.nswor:

;r.d./or inclividunls was one wcy of sol.vinG tho souvenir problen that oc.do
technical intell.ic:once collection c1ifficul t.

1..

Ho te Jill. Instructor:

3.c;·.10ve Ch{'.rt I-2906-1 ..

n.

Instructor Co:-::.1ont:

The 5250th Tochnicnl Intclliccnce

Coupcny wns evaluuted by G2 1 GHQ, Fo.r :Ee.st Con.-:a."'ld in 19,.:1:7

['..S

:follows.

{Fron Vol. VI I Intelli 1~enco Series G:-!Q. Fm 1947). ·

1TThe principle o:f hnvinc n

coordinctin~

U.."lit for Tcch..nicnl Intolli-

sencc l_'"lroved highly satis:factory in tho (rcnuin:i.nc) :1ontl'ls of tho

Centro.1 control. nedo·

tt

"Wf'X•·

possible for tea.DB contai-ninr; representatives o:f

the siz services to be fused 1nto c.ntl function as cc:-1posi te f'ield un4. ts.
This enabled the nenbers to a.sr;ist one another '-':urint; t110 first cleys o:f

on operation •.-1hon -speed. wns rJ.1 i::l]?ortm1t.

In:f'or;.w.tion, c1ocu.ncnts,· m:..cl

equipncr.t were collected f'or f'_ll brv.nchos o:f scryiccs by

r-~11

the equipnent wna asse.:Jb'.1cd in n contrcl J..ocction whore i t
cvnlur::.tod by tho individual service toc.u concerned.

tco:.1S, erid

\1c.s

sorted end

Ccorc1-inr:tion nlso

nnde it :r>ossiblc to ·have ndoquntol;,... cqui:)pod tcDJ1s foraod. end trcir..cc1 in

tine :f'or nll. opcrc.tions ond it
covernce.
Wl'..S

uss~od

con1Jloto

~cchnicnl

Intolli{-:oncc

A c0.::.1prchcnsivo view of Jnpimose cquip:1ont end Ct:',pnbilitios

secured nnd r,ositive results wore obtnL.1ca...,n

Connent:

J..:ftcr tho fornution of 5250th Toclmicnl Intolliconco Conpci.::.1.y,

tho field tco.n.s operated under concro.l 0rc1crs fror.1 Arny Hoadqua.rtors.

They plv.nnod tl·ll:L.· «•wn i tincrc.rios, secured trw,::r_)ortc.tion., took niror
oner.~

eqp.ipDent fron conbnt troops to when they wore not necessarily

attnched, end did o.11 this by rather cooprohonsivc ci.uthority fror.1 tho
krr:r:;r that they were 11 to proceed wherever nocossnry to socuro CD.pturod

oneny equipn.cnttt.

They often hc..d to win the cooporc.tion of nen who hr-.d

never hcrnrd o:f Tochnicnl Intollic;cnce ci.nd hc.d 110 conccpti on of its

r.1issio.~

They not only hnd to be conb[',,t non nncl tcchniccl vnclysts, but nlso :first

cla.ss sclosncn who could to.l.k their i:my tlu:-ou.Gh
l.7

I-1~8F-5J.
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n r,:·-:y ~11
1:
r~
i.i ;.'··-..:.? [, L_-.'.)

i:-:::i

- .,
r=-"
!~~-~

IJ

One one occn.sion a teDP WL'S refused per::.1ission to

n tus!i:: force on

f'.Il

opcrc.tio:::i.

['.cco:1:;_![1J:'l~'

Dvcn clter nrrivr.l with n t[!.sli: for co,

Corps, or division, problcns nrose reanrclinc:; stntas Mel.. pornission to

C::LDST!Oi:J:

c.

.Lnswcr:

in:kT WLS ~1-I:E SOLuS.:I01T FO?, ~:rs p::03L.El-1?

The problcn Ul'.S solved. by o..ttr'.chinc <d'tor July 19·.'.:L.:,

to the hor'.c1qnertcrs of ernios,

r'.

Tochniccl Intolliccnco of:ficcr who wns

responsible to cocrdin..-..tc tho r'.ctivitios of tcr-;:s furnished by US.:...SOS to

t!l.o i.1rny.

lins\1cr:

tho

~ccL'1.iccl

}iorl:inc in tho Office of

.t:~C

of S, G2 of tho J.rDy•

Intelligence Coordinc.tor: .
( 1)

Coordinc.tod tho nctivi tics of r>.11 Tcc..'mic['.l Intcllir:cncc t:ni ts ::._1ll:ccd on

(8)

tou~?orD.ry

C..u.ty with the .Arr:ry.

Iininto.incd lid son between G2 .drny rncl G2 US.~SOS
(Tho~tor Service Troops).

(3)

Advised G2, U&i.SCS c.s to nunbor c.ncl conpo:s iticn of
teN.is fro:.1 5250th :L'oclmiccl Intol1iconco

Co.:1r-~'

no0dccl by .b.rny.
( ..:;)

St1:;_)crvisGcl the trf'.ininc .1}l'O;'\rf'n for troo:;_rn on to.:::.ni-

eel intolligonco r.1c.ttors.
(5)

.b.ctod ns liv.inon officer for tho United Stutes Tech"li..
c1.:::.. Intolliccnce Depot (tho cn_::iturod onony cquil)f.:ont

depot in tho 5250th T. I. Co.) to ins'l..lre the :floH o:f

cri.pturecl nl'.teriol.

Jinswcr:

Closer coorclinntion wc.s ost['blishocl between tho

te~1s Dnd key :;_->ersonnel of vorious tnsk force !1cndqunrtors l"nd tho conbc..t

troops.

The flow of infarnr,tion rmcl nr:toricl fron the toC'.':1.S in the fiold
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n.

Inntructor Conncmt:

( 10 ni:.mtcs)

Tho liborc·.tion of' the Philli_:_:inos proviclc

:s \iith c.:-:cellent cxc.r.1plos of' tho techniques developed by the 5250th
erl Intclliccncc

Con~r-ny.

~ochr..:..

i'he nethods of' tho i'ochnicc.1 Intclliccncc 'Units

::ttr-chccl to tho Sixt:1. any 'l'..rO worth C.otcilcd study occa.usc the

::>rinci:;_:i-lo~

vo hl".vo discuused woro hero r-.pplicd with c. strikinc f'orcc.
b.

QUZST IOM:

ThQ Tochnicnl Intellir:;cnce Coordint"'.tcr with Sixth

.f.ns\·10:r:
J:;rny

cvc.lu..""'.tod rnc"t coupil.cd l'..1:1. .field tem.1 reports.

He c..lso

coo~)Crl'..ted

with other intclliccncc Si_)_ecirtlists in disscnhl..r:..tion o:f inf'orr;c:tion £':.1i.d

intellicenco to con bet uni ts on captured or~9r.:.y r.intcri.nl.
c.
.;T?..lC!~D

QP'::JSTI 01::

TO s1x12::

~J-IT .AS -~

.b.11s·wor:

P'.2.CVISICH.:-..L FIELD D:JPOT?

:i'ho Field Unit 0_:1orr.tinc the l_"Jrovisio:n.c.l field

depot l:'..ctocl cs u contrl".l collection c.nd storcv;c t:'{':onc:r f'or nll cc.pturod

:i..".tcric.l.

This -;:mi t

cl so conducted rv.:_1id lc.borntory mclysis in the

i'iel(l :tor tho Field Units •.

iii:ID ALLOTTTID?

.Ans·w,er:

EC'.ch Field trni t consi stod of six field ten::·.s,

s<mcrnlly ono officer rnd two (2) .ncn, rcprescntinG the six nnjor

brt:'ncho s of service concerned with sup:1ly.

They wore i.ni tit'..lly nosi:;nod

with cHvisions.

UHITS TO J ..CCOHJ?LIS3: T?JJIR IHSSIG1T OF
.Answer:

FI~

H:v::JS'I'IGi.TIVJ::T ilT.D COLL1XEi.1 IOH •

Lic.ison wns nc.intnincd between the division G2 ttnd

tho cour.1C'.lldinc of'f'iccr of the ur.. i t.

En.ch tenr:, in turn, cstf'_blishod

liv.ison with its respective Service Chief nt tho division hondqnertors.
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.i..nswor:

S:::.:JTIC:.!S l2ID CCHB.t..T C..'9.00PS?
Unit uctivitios ro:_)orts were subr.i.ittoc1- nonthly

throuch G2 chnnncls.

'Joinc for1vc:rdcd C..ircctly to tho Chiefs of Service Pnd to G2,

us..·.scs.

1!.rny of t!1.o toclmica.1 rc;:iorts were :published in tho Technicr_l Intolliccrlcc
t~'lc

Socticn of the Sixth i..rny G2 Uoeldy Report, prcp['rcd by
Tecli..nicl"..l Intollic;onco Co ")rdinc.tor.

.dosults of tho tests conducted by tho

0

Field Uni ts or tcl'.ns wore nc.do nvv.ilr."blc to nll r:;::;oncios
wore of i;.'!;-:1cdintc

tec~"icr'J.

AnswoF:

SiA:th i:.:rr.J.Y

C-=':L1.co:;.~nod

['.n.d

vc.1.uc.

Tho cric;in.:'..J. plcn o-f J}lc.cinr; Field Units ui th

divisions, where tlloy 01)crv.tcd unc1.or the Di ·v·i si0n G2 ar~d ·wore confil:lod

to tho clivision zone,

W[".J3

.founc1 to bo too rir;ic1.

.:.i.tt.::--.cl'!::10nt directly to

corps docreC'..socl 1 ini son dif'ficul ties ru1c1- :i_)or.oi t ted 'l,·!iclcr sco:;o f'or tho
opcrc..tions of fiolc:.. t;cc.;•s.

h.

.hnswcr: '. :J:.:-.i:;orionco

c~.inod,

;rc..sultod. in t::.:.c onissinn of

Q,ucrtcrr.10..stor CTid !-Icc"'!..iccJ. tcnr:s fr0n tho J7iclc.l Units.
woro conposcd· of Orclnc.n.co, E:ncinocr,

Sir~nnl,

Thorol:ftor,

;;ncl ChcnicD.l tccris.

units

Cnc

Q;.inrter;:1astcr .nnd ,pno :rcclicE>.l o:fficor i.1ere .:cs s iDncd to opornte c.liroctly
under tho control of tho Cori_"ls G2 wl:.cro they ho;1.c1lod tho toch.nical

intelliccnco of their
i.

brCi~chcs.

Instructo::- Cor.1.::cnt:

Ono :;oint,

shoul::.1 be cnphnsized,

r-.nd

thnt is the t;rcnt flc:;:i bili ty of o:,_)orc.tio:1 that \·Jns :i::icrni ttod by tho

orcnnizc.tion of tho 5250th

Tocl~icnl

Intelliconco Con_'.)l'.lly.

Do not con-

sider the orcn.n.iz['_tion of tho Fiolcl units .::i.s ricicl.

1·:0 have cliscusscd

tho nclcc up o:f tco;-.1s nn.d t!io opor£'..tionc.l proccclure s

in c:onera1 terns to

point out tho ntb.J.J.dc..rds ['l.Chiovec1 f'nc1 tl1e dcvelo:;_:Jr.1cnt of principlea to
20
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~ccon:plish

the tcc:hnicnl

intolli~;cnco

oission.

In cctunl prr:.ctico, tti"'lits'

:enns, nnd coordint:'.tors wore tPilorcd f'or specific opcrz·tions.

Trc.ininc;

:nd orc~nizl!.tion could be plnr..nod for ef'.Cl1. op0rv.tion by tho 5250th. ~ecr.n:!cr>.

Units operctinc with the J.rnios r-ntl. task forces coulc

!ntclli:.:;oncc Con1Jl:l1Y•

ircv.nizc to nect the chcncinc;
13..

situ~tion

in the cru:1::H1i{;n.

TEC:::.TICJ..L rni:i.~LIGElTC:J Ur T?:::-J POST ii.Ad. PillICD

n.

Instructor Oot?.nent:

Mter tho s;.1rronc1or of

( 8 ninutcs).
Gorr:~rny

rmd

J~pn.'1.,

the tochrdcl'.l intellir;cncc orr;ruiizetion built UD c'.urh1[; tho lo.st yeor of th-

vr.r nltored rl"'.clicv.lly uncl..er the inf'lucmccs of rr-.:_-,id clcr.:obilizntfon, t!10

leh~illG nissions of th~' occu...'l?r,tion,
1

ri.

lC'.cl: of fu...'ld.S•~ end tho loss of

s9cciclist ::::iersonnel.
'b.

Q1CSTI011:

i[:J& UJ.S TJ:3 P::.:Il:CIPiJJ i-IISS!OH CF TZCIJUCJ.L

hnswcr: , Toclmiccl into'llicc:lco units c::nrJinccl onony prod11ction :fncilitios, i_1roclttction oxpc:•ts met rcsonrch Pnd dovclopoont

instnllo.tions.

Tnrt::ets wore nssicnocl by tho Uo.r Dc:-;?ortnont.

Answor:

·.Tho 5250th Tochnicnl_ L"'ltcllie:;er:.cc Co:-~:;_-,ro1y was

innctivntocl in Juno 19·1?.

Tho Toch.i1icc.l Intol1i:-;oncc =>otnchr.iont, Gcnorr.l

Eer:<lqun.rtcrs, Fer :Bc.st Coff.:.£'n\:l vies r,cti vntod in its place.

A!lswqr:

The

~ecr~1ical

IntelliGoncc Dctc.cbnent carried

out investigations, r.mintcincd surveillnnco 0£ Japanese proc1uction

ties, c:nd nado reports in

sup~ort

of the civil

~eoncios

iUG nuthori ty of the nilito.ry t;ovorw.umt of Jc.pan.

21
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Yle see that technical intel!.igence activh

ies in the immediate post war '._:)sriod ;-;ent through two s-'c.ages.

!lvestigation cf' tha

s vd th
~hen,

Fi.rst, an

enemy production and research ef'f'ort w1:ich provi.ded

a mass of' valuable mnterial f'or strategic .::.nto1ligonce rur}-'oscs.

tho sec end phase, th a trained s':)ocialists remaining a.ftor demcbiJ.i-

iation were u.tilizod ··to support the military governmont activiti<0.s of tho
~ics of' Occupation.

:f.

QUESTIOH:

WHLT HLS FCN

otm

I'RINCIP£L I':-'.ACETIHr: AG:CHCY FOR

rnE COLIECT10N OF INFORM1:..T IO~~ FOR TECHHICsL
Answor:

:l~''lET 7

IC:EECC'?

Ou.r '$rinci. al ·;_:oacoti.mo Etgoncy h9s__ boen th c Hil.i t&rJ

ittache systom.

3EEN f1BIE T0 i LHl'J.'LIN F-OR 'fECHNIGAI> INTELLIGENCE SINCE 294 5·?
£.n~::

Th~

tochnicv1 sc~d.cos hc.vo r:-aintainc.:d nma11 intoll:t-

gonco c·rganiz~1tions, usually -,::i thin tho

cJ:iof cf service 1 s of'fico, to pro-

eoss inform::-.tion for technical intolllgoncc.

They :'1Fvo boen ha;-r1::-;crod by a

leek of funds end spcciclist_pcrsonnol.
h.

QUESTION:.

IN THE POSTWi..R CH.:.:.~GES C'F THE Lf!TY ORGLNIZf:..TJC:T,

C!.L HIIEI:: IGENCE 11 ?

L..nswor:.

Do-pertmcnt of tho 1.. rmy-, G2 ocsur::cd tho rosponzibilit~

for tcchnicnl intcillig::.ncc f'rcm G2 L.rmy Service Forcos ·::h~m I.SF functions
uoro pJ.ac:.:d under Gt, D,E:ipcrtmont o:f tho l .. rrr:y.

Tho functions o:f both G2 i .. SF

and the Military Branch, Military Intclllge,noo

Service as port.eins to

tcchniccl intolligonca wore pl:::cE..:d u_71dcr Technical Brcnch, Intelligence

Group, Intclligonco Division,
14.

SUMVJ~RY

Go~crcl

( 5 minutus).

n.

Stnf:f,

Dc~Drtrnont

Instructor Comr.,ont:

of tho

~rmy.

Tho beginning of

World WDr II :found us v1i thout en orgnnization :for tcchniccl intolligonco.
While we had reccivod some information :from cur militnry cttochos in tl'D
years before tho \"mr,

'."JO

de} ended upon our ellic. s .for tho technical

22
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intelligence vi tel to a sci€mtific resoerch end dovolopment progran,
strategic pl::mning, combat int cl.lieEinco, end tho treining of troops in
the first pc.rt pf' the i:rar.
t='roductiv~

efficient and

We still mDi!ltain closo , lj?iJ..son y;ith tho

Technical Intclligcnce of' tho British Cor.ur.onncoL

Wo soon rce lizcd our noc<ls.

b.

Rogulation of' tho f lou of' c!:\n-

turod m9torial end the fixing of' responsibility :for ·reporting i;ms the fi:_
step.

Then, i t ·was- directed that tho primers·· use .of' co.pturod mc.torial

Vff_

This accol,..::retod the dovolopmont e-.t V'!c.r Dopartmont (Di.)

for intelligence.

lovol of' en orgonization to -process tcchn:lcc.1 int. olligcnco.
services expanded its ;l.ntcllig0nc0 organizctic·n.

E~rporicnco

Each of' tho
dictntc.d

th~t

collecti m could bo bost done-,by tr~inod snccialists op.;.;rating ir: small

detcchmonts in the

f'orrn.,~ra

l"'ru~s.

B1~t

tho first employment in North .:".fr3.c

.

.

of' En8my Equipment--. IntalligE:mco Service T,onms, composed cf s:rociolists f':t"

the six services T·:es a __ f'ailuro.
organization £nd

operctin~

"£b.oso

t~01ms

did not,

·bocousc of' their

proccduros, produce tho comb£t intoJ_:tigcncc

needed by the fighting troops.
c.

In Europe 1

corps, and divisions.
of' the

·to er.is 1..,rom

n single sorvica, q:cr[Ltod 'l·.·ith crmios

Gt-norol.ly spooking t.hoy >Toro under

the control

special stcff of:f.iccr of thoir porvico end r:1C.intecincd inf'orm:-l .

liaison -..-:-i th tho intelligonce officer· of'

oporo.ting.

th~

Combat intolJ.i-gonco aspects of'

comrac-nd

tochnic~l

-~ii th

,::hich thuy i::or(

intelligence

~:cro

provided thrcugh the intc.rchcngc of' inf'"orm.ction bot·.mon sr.;e:cicl and genor
::te.ff' o:f'f' ic0rs •

In the Pacific, to supprrt an c.mphibiot.1.s 'i:nr, a 'I'echn:i! ca1

d.

Intclligonco Company ·:•as f'ormod ns a theetor unit.

Oporcting :f'orcos hod

cttached Tochnic<::!l Intelligonco Field Units composed of'

1x..,cms from e::ach

sorvice, trained £0 r the spocif'ic oporation, and cnpab1o of' conducting
field investigation end collection and rapid riald test end annlysis.
Generally speaking, thos0 units opuratod undor the G2 of' tLo command and
maintained liaison with Gach special stof'£ of'.f'icor of' tho force headquarters.

L

technical Intelligence Coordinator ·.;cs ettachcd to tho G2

23
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to insure coordinaticn in technical intelligence nctiv:itius.
e.

In the p0st nar period, tho c.ccupoticn mission, less er
le.ck o:f' £\mas, chcngod the; crgcr.izcticn cf'

specialist. porsonnel, and a

t8chnical intelligence to meet nm:: needs under

~ltGrcd

cond:iticns.

Study 0£ the 0xpericnces o:f' \1';orld l'!er II, has resulted in tho cdc·pticn
c.f f'oeturc•s

or

both tho

orgo.niz~tion

os dovolcpod in tho Pecif'ic end cf'

the organization developed in Europe.

Tho cb,jcctivcs hcvc been

r::8ll

aerinod and based ein pest o:xporionce '",:c can e:xpE.:ct tho organiznti0n to
deve::lcp tc moot tE-c v£rying noods o:f' f'lu:id opuraticns en a global sccle
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Abbreviations
AC of S G2 -Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
USASOS - US Army Services of Supply
ATIS - Australian Technical Intelligence Service
CWS - Chemical Warfare Service
ENGS - Corps of Engineer
ORD - Ordnance Department
QM - Quartermaster Corps
SIG C - Signal Corps
SURG - Surgeon General [Medical Department]
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STUDENI' SUMMA-'RY

HISTCRY

.QE TECHNICAL Ii'11'ELLIGENCE
SECTION I

our LiNE

OF CONFERENCE

l . SCOPE.
Organization and· operations of technica1 intelligence
during and immediately following Worl.d War II.
2.
INI'RODUCTION. Technical. intelligence has 'been conducted in .eome
form throughout histo.ry.
Only in recent years, however, has system and
organization been introduced in the conduct of' technical. and scien-'Gif'ic
intelligence.
In tne United States Army, technical intelligence organization dates f'rom ·,1~1d ..'ilar I-I •

.

3.

TECHNICi-1.L INI'ELLIGENCE AT THE BEGINIHNG OF WORID WAR II. a. The
United States.
In the years just prior to the United States entry in the
war, the principal collecting agoncy .for technical :i.ntelligencG i!rl'ormation
had been the ~ilit&ry attaches stationod ·in foreign capitols. They wer0
hampered by a lack of funds and in somo cases hnd used their 0~1n :funds to
carry out the collection of' technical information. Each o:f the technical
.::wrvices had a small- .intolligence- organization, but there wo.s no overall
dirGction of' tf:1chnical intelligence activities by the War Depart.mcnt.
In 1940 tho National De~ense Roscarch Committee had boen f'ormod and, when
in 1941 this became tho Off'ico o:f Sciontif'ic Research and Devo1opment,,
the U. s. had an effective scientif'ic dovolopmont of'f'ort. This agency required technical. .intelligence but Pearl Harbor day f'ound the U. s. without
tho no cos snry supporti·n~ intc.:J.ligence organization.
b.
Germany. The Germans had a throe-f'old program consisting
of a no..tional sciontif~_c dovolopment systum, a technical intelligence
organization in the armed £orces, and~a supporting intclligonco source
uithin tho industri.al cartel syst0m organized in .the ec.rly 1930s. Tho
co.rtel system, through control of' pc.tcnt.s- and industrial. information,
tapped foreign-countries f'or technical and scientific inf'or:nation. At tho
smr.0 timo ·this system carof'ully ·guarded Gormun industrlo.l, scicntifc nnd
tcchniccLl developments. For oxamplo vJhile·Germany acquired US dovol.opmc.nts in aircraf't instrumonts, the cartels denied thG US important chemical.

d...:vclopm.onts •
c. The British Commonwealth. The British hud an extremely of'f'octivc technical intelligonco orga!lizat,ion, MI-lO, which will be discussed
in detail in another class.
Initially the. US dupondod upon MI-10 :for the
technicel intelligence needed duspornt0ly in the US conduct of tho war.
While tho US was to continue the close cooperation with tho British and
Australians, it w~s soon found that a compar~blo organization was neodod
to fill the u. s. spccic.lized nc0ds •
4.

THE DEVELOPivID.1T OF U .s. TECHNICAL INI'ELLIGENCE.

a. · War Department Technical Intelligence was chargud to tho
!.1.ilitery Intolligon~e Service of the Gonero.l Staf':f and the technical servic0s r functions were placed under G2 hrrrry Service Forces. Enemy EquipmE:nt Intclligenco Service Teams (EEIS Teams) wero i'ormed with representativ8s 0£ all six services in cGch toam; and tho tonms were employed in
North Africa in t:Jnrl.y 191+3•
1
I-14.88-51
:-:·----~

,.;

>;-

._.::>

i::-~~_:~

~

r-~

Li <~
b.

~he

1(-:-1

~7..> r~-.:--""

w: : <z-~~)

Ll

f,1
.. :)

u ,'.:.

EEIS Teams had four duties:

( l)

To gather enemy equipment for ~tudy.

(2)

To examine enemy production f'acilities af'ter capture,

(3)

To question and examine ene~ production e:qJerts when
captured.;

(4)

To determine f'aults that appeared in our own equipmem
under combat conditions.

c. The EEIS Teams were considered to be .failures in North A.fri
. Partly because of a lack of experience in the teams, but mainly because
· organization and procedures~ the teams f'ailed to produce the desired re
The emphasis in operations was on the collection of' onenzy' equipment. Li
or no technical intolligenco was passed f'rom th~ teams to the intcllig8n.-;
of.f'icors and technical service staf'i' off'icers vJithin the theater, nor was
the collection effort itself sound. Non-st:ilective collection bonef'itod
noi ther the theater nor the War Depa1,·t;mont. Ono result o;f tl1e he.sty
collection of' ill-assorted ma.torial '.'J&s to hami;;cr the collection activit
of British Tochnicnl Intelligence who hv.d boon producins information for
bat -intal.ligcnco •.

a. As a result of tho cxpcrionco in .~!o-..--th A~r::;_ca,
made in War Department Technical Intc11igonco ··or:;: '1j_zcb on~
MIS con~on~ro.tea- its tE?chnical intelligohcc ncti ;_-..:;ics in a si I'!f::l.e sec•
tion, Tho I\Ililitary Roscnrch Section, Military Br«.r.:hu A ~c 1:"!·'.:!Vc ~-r,nt. step
was tho issuta-100 of'· a"' directive by 'the Combined c . . ~.:_0.fS of SLc:.f.:i' ~~hat ste•
tho most important USO for capturod oncmy cquipm0:1t Vla.S for intclligonco
purposes.
.1

e. To i,mplemGnt ·this dccisi·oh the War Dopnrtmcnt, through
circulc.r., ostablished priorities for·cnpturod en0my equipment.

( l)
(2)

P.

Intolligonco re<, uj.remcnts o:f Uni tod States nnd
Allied governments.
Opo:rnt:i.on<.:l mid tro.ining ro~ui:r-.;monts wj_thi..n tho
\.Jhorc ccpturc<l.

th_~n.1.tor

(3)

~rciin:tng roquironcnts .for troops in

tho United

Staten and for overseas US Cornmc.nds.
(4)

Roqtd.r.:.;mcnts_ :for dj_sp~_<.:ys .f'or purpos0s such e.s
industric.>.l inccntivo, war manpower rocruiting, or
~1.~r bond proL;otion«>

:f.
With thusc changes at. tL.·-~ Wc..r Dope.rtmcnt level, r-..ft.cr
June 1944, Technical Intellj_g..:r:::o Tc<· ms 'iJC'~v to· ri1.·\:rrtc unG.er MIS general
control at -t,hcatcr lovcl with g..:·i1(..raJ. coordin.:-::ti0n ~.nd :}.s0ig~1mont of
priority targots .from· thu Vlur Dop;::..rti,-iont,. To[·.ms woro ·:.,o opE;.;ro.to with
Ar!nY, Corps; and Division, whore they wore· ch,.,,,_rged vii th the collection
of' co.pti.t.red en0my r,1P.t0rial i'or intelligence plirposes.

g. Direct·ivcs estz-·bllshod e. system ·of evacuation and repo1;ting
'f:or all captured mP:.teriel. Croptured mP.terial would be evc-ccu,~tcd through
supply and ser~,"ice c.hnnn-.. ls to tho Theater Chief' of Service who "vas r;~s
ponsible to ship i t to the approprie'.tc test and annlysis inst['_ll~_tir::in in
the Zone of' Intc.:rior. Reports wcro also f'or1N~.rdod through technical
I-l48S·~
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sc.rvice channels to tho Theater Chief' o;f S0rvice wh.:; reported to Chief' of'
Sc::-vico L t ~Var Dcrinrt.r:;ont. Any "!ital in.formntion or intclligcr:.cc \'J".. S to·
be furniehed the S2/G2 by tho technical sorvico stalf officer nt each lov0l.
Thu result was t·hnt technical. intelligence wa.s availablo f'or comb.:..t intolligcnco uso both ~-s spot reports in the fiE;.;ld end c-.s finished studios
dissor..inntod by the Chiof" o.f S0rvice or tho MIS.

5.

TECHNICAL P'TELLIGEl·1 CE IN THE EUROPEAN 'l'HE1;.TER

O!t~

O?EH.ATIONS.

c.:..
Whilu Wnr Department Technical Int0lligoncc hrd chnngcd its
orgcnizc::.tion af'tor the· oxperionco ge.inod in North Africa_, tho chl'..ng.:..is
i::rdo within the EI'O were duo to lc;ssons lo.::.rnod in North Africn Emd Itn.ly
by the.: cor,IDa1J.ders. and stnf'f's asscr:1blod in England proparing f'or tho No:r:-Inl'.ndy invc.sion as· vJOll n.s th0 re cont ohr..ngos nt Har Depc.rtoont level.
.As
a typical cxomplo of' th;.:; trond in the ETO, the Tho.'"'tcr Chief' of Engineers
·found thnt units vvc'ro .r0rorting ns now, mines thnt ho.d alrcr:.dy bcon en ...
countered by e.nothcr unit.
Tho leek of prompt dissominlltion 1.dthin tho
thc;.:.tor wns en.using needless loss of li:fo, oquipra.:.:.nt nnd t j me.
A study
1·ms ur.do of' British ::;;mthods of' handling . . . nginuc:i: "tcchnicnl intolligonco.

b. As a rosuH> of' ~.this study it ;;u:s rocom."Ile:nd.:.:.d to tho Chiof' of'
Engin(,ors th~.t engineer technical intolligonco t onns hi~· orgn!lizc..d [>.nd
nttLchod to US Corps '~nd Arr:1y· Ho=1dqu.::.rtvrs. These t0n.r::1s . .-;ould colluct
onomy cnginot..:r equipncnt nnd inf'orm-.:ttiQn nbout such cqulp1aon·G, and disseainnte such de!.ta. _and t,10.tcrinl. ns quickly es possible uhcn o:f imm . . . dirtto
importnnce, to the.; cor,1bet troops.
:i:n any event tho int'ornution c.nd mr:.toril'.l
'•ms sont to ·the Zono of' IntL.rior .for research nnd analysis. Her Dopo.rtr:10nt
collection and ta.rgot. inf'ormetion was provided by the MIS orgc.nizntion c.t
thouter li_.vol through tqo The.::.t0r Chief' Engineer.
c. The other services e:.ctivated t cchnicc.l intolligcncc tc.:::.ms tho.t
opuratcd in tho se-6.e r..annor. All toc:ms, howovi..:.:r, '<7ere more or less dcpendc.nt upon their sa.losmc..nship when oporating in tho fi.old.
There wc.s no
forr.ictl link ui th the int0lligonce of'fice;r nor was their c.ny coordinc.tion
in the coll0ction .:..f'forts b(...tvwon tonos of' dii'i'orcnt scrvice:s.
Liaison
r.nd coordino.tion wc.s up to tho toan co!:'l..111c.ndc.:r.
Yet excellent results
were achiovod in the c".::1pc.ign on tho oohtincnt. The degree of assistance
given thu tun.ms by. the combnt tre>ops. through t'ho _S2/G2 '<'~as in f.1ost c2~scs
in direct proportio~ to the QQount of tq~hnic~l intelligence furnished by
tho tcr.~r:1 f'or corabnt intolligcnco use.
d.
When in lcito 1944 r.nd c or.J..y l 945 nn crtillcry :::i.or::unit i on
shortEge devolopod in tho ErO nnd Ivll'O tho tcans did outstc..nding ;.10rk in
providing the n.:..c0ssnry j_ntclligoncc to turn C[lµturcd guns ['gainst the
Germans.
In Fro.pee,, Third .k.rmy•s XX Corps cmpl.oying thirty-nine captured
piccos including 'ton 88mrr~ guns o.nd f'our 76.2mm S0vi0t guns f l.rc<l 30920
rounds in support of' US troops.
In ono week 80% of' tho artillery ammunition f'irt:..d by the Corps wn.s capturod r;,.'J;t0rinl.
In Jt,nly nmmuni t i on intorchangev.bili ty charts proparod by Ordn.c:.nco Technicc::l Int0lligonco nllowod
US units to f'irc thous~.nds o.f rounds of' cepturcd Itc-.1.icm rmd Gorrnnn 8lmm
mortar aUJ.!;.unition. Training litorc.ture produced by Signal Tuchnical
Intelligence enabled US force3 to uso qu2ntitics of' captured :field tolophono
oquipmont.

o.
One vc.rir..tion in tho evr:.cuation systcr.1 "' os mndc by SHAEF.
Sinco cxcQllcnt f'aciliti0s existed in tho Uni tod Kingdom for t .... st nnd
nnnlysis,, cc.pturcd mt•.t0rin.l wr:..s ev<::i.cuatc.:d i:;o tho Uni tcd Kingdom for processing by the British tochnicel intolligonco ngoncy.
Results of tho
tests wore in .the he.nds of' tho troops in n mnttor of' days. Snmplos and

3
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reports of tho tc;sts r:tn~o wore sent to tho United St,::::.tes for further
detc..ilod test nnd analysis by th.:: t(:chnical service concornod. Finished
studies wero then dissominntod to US troops in Europe.

6.

EARLY· TECHNICAL UITELLIGBNCE ACTIVITIES IN THE

Pi~CIFIC.

o.. Until Novomb<.-r 1942 t,)· ,!re '\Nas little tochnic.'"'.l intolligcnct
activity in the Pncif'ic. No US tt. .e:hnicnl intelligence tu.:'.r.1 oporntod in
thv .field. Enoo.y cquipnent cnpturcd by both .b.mcricc..n o.nd Austrr,licc.n fer.
·was 0vncu~ed to Land Hcadqunrtors, imstrailian Arrri:y in Austro..lia :.·Jhcrc.
i t vvns t(.,stcd nnd anc.lyzod by exp.:..rt porscmnel. The ontiro ch;~.nnol of
ov::-~cuation, initially, was .t"iustrali,..._n.
When US technicnl intolligonce
personnel bogcm to :::.rrivo in tho thc:::·_t0r, tho Austrc.linn tochnicnl in ..
t0lligcnco service pssistoc in their tre.ining.
Ono invaluable c~id was
tho oxt .... nsivo collection o:f cnµturod r.interial B.VHil~:blo in b.ustrali.2.

b. US tochnic£~1 intelligenco in tho PGci.fic nrca dr'.tos fror1
November 1942 11hon n Wrrr Dcpo.rtmcnt circulGr csto.bllsh0d o. systom of
processing for captured mc..terinl. Under this cliroctivo, tho flovil' of
m.:.;.tGrial was from cof'lbat zono, through norr:ial rocovury ch8.nncls, to the
Thcr·t0r Spe:ci.:i.l Stuff Officer of tho npproprintc service where o.. prcliril
tlry CX})crt ::,nnlysis ·was f'lri.do bcfi.Jr•.; th.:.i n¥. tvrial wns for.r rdcd to the C!:.J
cf tho service in tho United states:. ThcatDr di:.:·cct.cd that hr:lf' of th::.
r:r·t,~rio.l wnu to gt~ to tho US nnd he_lf' tq .lmstralin f'or test r.md <:!.nalysi:
by Australinn Fc·rcos. .Inf'ornO:tir,nnl rop6rts on r.11::-ct~rinl pnsncd through
chrmnols f:C-•)f.1. co:,11Jat troops to S2 or G2, then to G2, GHQ, to th•; War De·
pc.rtncnt, cs well ns· 1ntorchcngor.bly -nmong the scr~ricc troops hnndling

tho materiel.
c. J~ system f'or cvo.cuo.tion .n.nd reporting had boon cstr.blishcdl
but not until Doccmbor 1942 ~ms rt beginning me.do in field collection by
trc.incd tccht)ical intolligenco .toams. Or.dnPnco tmd Chumicti.l Wnrfnre
toc~ns woro the first in the field and tho organiznt,ion,. b '.. c.:>.uso of its
oc.~rly success, of tho Ordno.nco-tonn sot tho p~tt0rn :for nll subscquont
tenn opcrc.tions.
d.

Tho Ordnance 1-,,~nn ·;ms divided into thre:c sections:
( 1)

Adrdnistr?.tive Socti· .n,. ~osponsiblo f'or gonornl suµor

,vision, reports; rend liaison .·i th ;yt.hcr intelligence
agencies.

·· ·. '

(2)

Field Te::m.1s,, bpqrnting ·,Jith t~sk forces, divisions, er
corps, collected rJnt,_rit:.~l c.nd nftcr me king prclinim11')'
reports shipped tho fii,.torinl to the nnnlysis section.

(3)

The Analysis Soctic~, analyzed tho ITI<ltorin.l rocoiv0d
frnrn f'iold toaf.1s, i:1ud0 reports, nnd then shipped the
mo.tc.rial to the United States.

o. The succ..;ssful opern.ti on of' the Ordnance and Chomiccil tern
brought a realizo.tion that tho thcr:ltcr orgc.nizatJ on was inadcquetc for
thoir supp·~rt. So in May 1943 CG of' .United Stntcs L.rmy Services of Sup~
(us1~sos, tho thu•·tur roar echelon) v1ns directed to ostc.blish a Cupturod
Enoi:zy EquiprJont Depot in i1ustralia. To control tho flow of natorial be·
tv:Jcon o.llios, cc.ch "'rd th ve.rying ncoc1s, a Joint Lllicd Captured Equipmcr.t
Boe.rd was :f or!:lcd nt tho so.no time. This board consisted cf' two Austr~l~
t»7 o Americo.n, nnd one NavD.l Offie er.. Tho bourd, f' or tho rest of' the rr.:
determined on the bu sis of' tochnicn..l nc,:.,d YJhoro L1ntc.rir.l \Jas to bo proM
f'or test and analysis.

1
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7. THE 5250TH TECHNICLL IN'''ELLIG:SNCE COMP..'.NY.
r~.
In Dccor..bcr 1943,
all tcchnico.l intclb.gor-..co c.cti vi tios of US Forc'"'s in tho Pacific
v1;..;ro dolag"'.toc tr, us •• S·)S.
This hor1dqm.>..rtcrs activo.tod the 5250th Tochnice.1 Inte:lligcnca Company, which, -.:ith its controlling hvc.dqEartors and fiold toar.1s fror:i
0c.ch of tho six s0rvicos, wo.s lnl.p~blo of coorC-:inr.ted ccllcction in th0 "field.
The Pc~cific '.Jnr \W.S c..n .::-~r.1phibicus vw.r in which tusk f' '')recs .?.tt11ckoc1 · sr.1ell
lr.nd nc.sses in o. vnst. r:i.~:-on. For opcrnti.:::ns in the Pe.cific the 525oth TcchniC='.l Intolligonco Conµr~n:y hC1.d distinct ndvunte.gcs for its orgr:mizc:t.icn
pcroi ttod:

( l) - A erouping of specie.lists f'roo six technical Sl.rvicos
with tho possibility of co~rdin~tod effort among then.

( 2)

I~

spocific tnblo of orgcnizc.tion e..nd oquipDcnt to
f'icld oporo.ticns.

fr..cilit~~to

(3)' Floxiblo

c.·pcrnti~)n nnd i:lt,voocnt resulting in n oorc
divorsif'icd nnd Ci)Oplctc c0v..;rngo.

Rc-.pic1 c1issoElinr:.tion o:f technical intolligcnc8 nnd
in.f'o~r12tion through groupe;d E.nnlysis sections.

( 5) , --Cantrel o.nd distribution of cnpturcd onof!ly cquipoont
by Cl contr~l c.g~noy t.o ~:10c.t tho training _anc~ tcchnicr.l
ne:eds o:f tho Thoc.tcr nnd the Zone of Int0rior.

{6)

it

w~s

F::1rr.~tltion .of well trained tear.is :for field cxploito.tion.

b. li!ith thoso r-.dvc.nto.gos inh0rent in tho ccnpc.ny ts orgc.nization,
nssigncd thci folloving nissions.

( 1) --To cvr'cluo.to :'.ll nvc-,il<bl.:.. onomy r:l<l torial, ~.nd :fr )f.l such
· ovnlu~.tion to deduce the stc.to of' onm::y rcsoUl~cos for
wa.r, to effect tho prom!Jt dcvclopnont of counter weapons
nnc1 c::.-untor tactics, <'.nc1 to· o:xploi t n0w j_duLS £or our
benefit._,
1

~

{2)

(3)

To provide pro!":1ptly litornturo, cxporionccd personnel
nnd L)th.or c.ids whiQh- \JOuld. assist in tho trc.ining of
troops in tho Tho,-1tor and in tho Zona of Int0rior in
thu use n.n? ri:::tintonanco of enemy oquipnont.
To suporviso the r ctonti,,n er disposi ti,)n of cncey
L:o.tcr:i.c.l by militnry orgnniz.?.tions or individur.'.ls, thoroby
. assuring tho. supply of ::-i.ll a'1nil'"'"blo i tor.1s which i:Jould
assist Tc:chnicetl Intwlligonco personnel in tho fulfillr:~cnt of the nssjgncd r-bjoctivo.

c. To acc.Jnplish its assigned rnissicns, tho compr'cny .·.ins composed
of a controlling c:nc.1 adninistre>.ti vo hcr..aqunrtors <'.nd six t ochnicc.l sections.
The conp~.ny cornnnndcr in addition to cor.mnnding tho csr.1pany f'unctioncd =ts
tho G2 T0ch1.1.icc.l Int ... lligo:1co Co :Jrdiv_t,)r in tho Office cf LC e;f s, G2,
USJ.SOS.
Er.ch Tcchr:.icGl S ..Jction 1aos C• ,171pos.:;d nf ;:.i_ LP.bor2,ti-1ry Tcr:.n 2nd en
Enor..y Equiprae;nt. Int..,lli2,'e;ncu Service Teno.
The Tocnicc..l Section upcrntcd
under tho tochnicc.1 supt;rvision of th~ Tho[,tor Chief •Ji' Service of tho
service to ::hich it bolongoc· o..nd uncl..;r the direct supe:i"visiG~1 of the G2
USLSOS through tho Conp.:-.ny Cour:.o.ndor. Within each section, tho l::::.borntory
functions of test end anelysis wore hc.ndlcd by . "..dr.linistrativc and i... nalysis
Unit (L•.._borntory ToaiTi p0rs0nnol) c.nd the field collection end r cports \"JOro
hondlod by tho Field Unit (EEIS Toan porsonnol).
1
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d. The coraj:::ic.ny maintu.inod liaison ·Ni th tho 1.\.lliod Trc:.nslo.tc..r
nnd Intorprotor Section (;.TIS) of' GHQ by assigning a liaison cffj_cor
to thr:t section. Eech Tochnicnl Section kopt a liaison officer on duty
in their r:.;spocti VO Chief' of sc,rvico. s Of':fice.
o. Tho ccup<'.ny mnintc.inod tho Technical Int0lligcnco Depot,
was n single cnpturcd onony cquipmont depot opert:""..tcd under the
supcrvisi<:-n of the Chief~ -Ql.l.Ert...:.rr.mstor .l.-.tw.lysis Section. Hero captured
oquipucnt vms recuivoc1, clo.ssifiod, rocurd..:;d, ~mc1 delivered to tho appr.:yl
ric-cto service as diroctud by the L.lliod Captured Enemy Equipment Boerd.

w~'lich

f'.
As im.1ic~·toci in tho assigned aissir.m scno i tons Y1cro rctur:ri
to the c.'.'"'r:·tu.ring 5.ndivic1uHl er unit. This v:e..s ono i,my o.f' solving the
eV·-r-prc~1..;nt souv~;nir problem.

8. TECHNICil.L INTELLIGENCE COORDIN:,TION.
n.
In tho initic.l opcrc~
undcrtnken by thu 5250th Technical Intc.;lligcnco Compc..ny, the Ficlc Units
opcrntiunal di:ff'icultics boc::1 .1SO there, ..-;as no enc to cc·0rdj n:--~to tho ope
in tho hcadqunrtors ._,..,:f tho force tc which tpoy were ~.ttc.chod. The rm.ny
loi.1s that nroso vrnro 5,_)lvod SL:.tisf'::::ctor:l.ly by tho assienr:1ont 0.f c Tcchni
Int.clligcnco of'f'iccr, after July 1944, to the hoadquartcrs of <:~rmios nri
task fc:rccs. This r:£ficcr, ;H)rking in tho office ·of :_C of S, G2, i)f the
force: v10.s ruspc•nsiblo f.0 cc.o:rC:in:"to tho activities nf tho Fiold Units
:furnished by USL.SOS to tho force.
Hu hci.d tho f .. -.~lowing cluti(.;s:
1

. ( 1)

.

..

Crn.,rc1iru::tod tho act.i vi tit"~s of ['.ll Tcchniccl Int.clli?'C!Ell
Units "plc.ccd on tonporar:/·c.uty tJith tho L.rny.
~

(2)

Iv'c.intainot1 liaison bct1r.rcon G2 iJ..rray and G2 USl.SOS.

(3)

iJ..dvisod G2 UblJ..$)3 as to tpc nur.bcr ond c>npnsiticn of
tur':ns f'r,)D 5250th Tcchtiionl. Intolligcnco Conpnny nc\:c•
by L.rr:ry.

(4)

Sup0rvis0Cl tho ·training progrn.n fur troops en tochniczl
intclligonco nr.tt0rs.

(5)

hCtod ns liaison officer :for tho 'united st~tcs Tochnicll
Into~ligonco Dopot (tho CG.J;!turod cnooy ...: quipnont dcfX'l 1
ini the
5250th T.I. Co.) to insure tho flou o.f' capt~'I
..
oc.-voric.l.
.. ,_,
i

sym

b.
J.. s a result uf the Tochnicr.l Intclligonco Coordinator
closer coordination wns ostnblishci"d ,b-..Jtucun the toans and key personnel
various tnsk. force ho['.dquo.rtors and tho cc;nbnt troops. The flm1 of i
tion ['_nd material f'rou tho tcn1:1s in the :f1.old end the depot WQS consid

expoditod.

9.

TECHNICL.L INTELLIGENCE O:f--'EH..:,TIONS IN THE FHILLI:PINES.
n. 'J:be
tochnL~uos qf tho 5250th Technicnl Int0lligonco Coopnny cllD
be studied in .tho Sixth 1.rny's co.npnign in tho Phillipines.

operationnl

b. The Tcchnico.l Inte:lligonco Ccc·rdi~1Gtor ·.dth Sixth .i.rr:iy
evaluc-ctod nnd c or:1pilod nll field t cnr;-1 reports.
Ho nlso coL·pcr:::tod with
other intelligence specialists in dissor..ino.ti·:m o:f informc.ti.-:m o.nd in~·
gcnce to combc>.t units on captured enemy oquipraont.
Ono Fiolt:~ Unit r;pc
the provisional f'iold depot ~nd actocl ns n contrul c..:)lloction and stc
agency .fur o.ll captured r:intorial. This unit also conducted rnpid kb . .
tory c..nalysis in tho f'iolc1 i'or tho Field Units. Tho other Field Units
tho op0rc.tion 02ch consisted of six .f'icld teams, gonor:i.lly ono off'iccr
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'am two ncri, representing tho six r.lLjor sc.rviccs c,:.nccrnod ·d.t:C supply.
wtinlly those uni·~:.s woro nssigned to divisionso Tho c0r.:r,K~1:;G.:t.ng ci"ficor
o! the unit r.:ic.int;ninod lic.is0n uith the G2 of' the division with which tho
,1lJlit \7:1S operating. Ench to(ln, in turn, cs t.~blishod linison with its
respective Chief' o:f Servico .!!t the di vision hendqunrtors.
c. Unit ncti"Titios reports wore submitted monthly through G2
ch!'nncls. Tochnicc..l reports vwre widoly diss<inin.:itcc1, c opics boing for-.;mrdcd
directly to tho Chiefs ,-,f Service nn<l the G2 of US.l.SOS. M::i.ny of tho tochni-er.l reports .•,1cro published in tho Technical Intelligence Soction o.f tho Sixth
Arey Technical Intcllig0ncc CocrdimJ.tor. Results of tho t csts ccnC:uctcd by
the F'iold Units or tee.ms ·.wro r.il""do nvo.ilablo to 2ll cgoncies C•1ncornod nnd
w..:ro of ir.~·1odinto t~ct.icn.l vn.luo.
d.

Che-ngos were rn::.do in tho be.sis of assignnwnt c.f tho Fiold
it was found thut assigrn:1cnt
to di•1ision, whore they r:p~rntcd under tho Division G2, was too rigid nnC.
nctod to liGit opor::..tir:-ns to the division zcno.
l:..tte..chL1ont .directly to
Corps docr0uscd xicison ~ifficultios and pcrni~tod wider scop0.:for the
operations ,)f .ficlc"! toans. · Expuricnco in this opcrc.tion ulso resulted in
cho.ngos in t:·io orcinniza.tl'on o:f the Field Units.
Tho Modicel c.nc1 qunrtornnstc.r too.:1s iwrc onittod .:-.nd one Quertcio1:k-c.stor o.nd one Modicc.1 officor
v:oro assigned to op~rnto directly ~nc10r tho Corps G2 •~hero they hnndlod
the mchnic~l intollieonco of thoi'r brc.11chcs f'o~r.mrly conductoc:! by the toa:ws ~
Units during the (;FJOrati·.:.•ns in Luzon, bccuuso

10. TECHNIC11L INTELLIGE.ECE IN·TEE POST '.~fi.R·PERIOD. u. During tho
surroncor p0riod, ·both in Gorr.'l&ny ~nd Japari, technical intolliccnco units
1..xc.cincd cncr:;y production f'c.cilitmcs, prcduction experts, <:nc.1 rosoarch
:-~nd dcvolcpucnt instn-lL.'l.tions.
Tnrgots v1ore £1..ssigno<l by the War Dopnrtocnt. In Japan thtJ 5;:::.5oth Technical Intolligonco Cot1puny finished its
invcstignti.;;n of Jl;.pilrios0 ·production f'.nd rvso£~rch instnllr.tions n.nd
occuv:ti;•n rtis9iqns _· grri.dunlly cltorod the ccoposi ti;:n of' tb.u company.
To conf•·rn ·~ith '·tho n ..:VJ nissions tho 5250th T. I. Co '.'JaS ino.ctiv".l.ted in
Juno 1947 Qnd tho Tochr.icr:l L1tolligonco Detachment, GHQ, Fnr East Com.-:innd
\WS 1:1ctivctod in its r:J.'.'.~'.''-'-.
'.:.:1"',_3 unit cLrriod out invostige_tions, maint['_incd
surveillance of Ja1:.F.;.r;~"30 ~-·~<tt.E·;~.Ln .fc.cili.-tios, ~~nd mde_roports in support
of tho civil agt:ncioJ" ni' .S;.; .;J) ·t.ho c:"h·(.'.c·c;J,:::1g Eiuthority o:f the railitfi,ry
E'.ovori1n0nt of Jii.;rau,.
b~- - Dcuob:!.J:·:_<:_~nt~.cn.,, lr>..d;: 0f f1<.nds.> locs of spccii:;tlist porsonnol,
0ccup.'1tion oission·.:::.
, .! :··.r: r.c,~ to D.lta:r ·i~i1e: tocl:-:iic:::.l intelligence organizntion bµJ_lt up r~~-;;~ '.n-::, -,;-_~; ",v:..· n8n:i:s ... · 11-s b<; t'or·a tho wur t.he principal
peacetir.ie c.:,J.l.-:;.3+.:L.1-: <:.::.~.= •L ;v· -:_,, ':,".1e; ;,G_~ :t·; <.·•.i'Y ,- ·;, -;·.£..·..:hu i .se'.l'.'ving in i'oroign
ca.pitols. The -t·cc·;c_;j.::::::.::. G-.: 1·,- 1.· ~cs· h ..x·.:": rr.:c:~ OJ:-.;: .. :. .i••",·l i : ::.t.E. ll~gr3n9e .organizations in the-~CJ.~j(;.:£.' ci' s~'):C'J.i.ceo:: Ui"iicc> bt.:t. in tho post war era
\Jere lli:.nporod by o. ll•cl;: of' £\nF1s nnd the; loss uf' specialist personnel
through tho rapid tlonobiliz~:d:;icn cf' tho i ..rrry.
0

c., v:hat hnd boon called 11 Wur Doparthl.ont 'l'echnicn.l Intelligonco"
was roo:rg.::r~ized du.!'ing the pest war changes in .Arcry org<:i.nization.
Depr:rtmont of' tho .t\.ro;>r G2 nssunud tbc rospo1i.sibi li ty for tochnicnl
intolligonco i'roo G2 J.~rn;,r Survico Fc:ccos when J;.SF functions wuro placed
under G2 Depnrtment o:f the .L.rey. The i'uncti ons of bm:.h G2 .£..SF nnd Tho
Military Branch, Militc.ry Intelligence Service as portains to technical
intolligoncc were plncod under Technical Brnnch, Intolligonce Group,
Intelligence Division, Gonorul Staf'£, Dcpartoent of tho Arnry.
l l . SU:MI.U.RY; a.
Tho US hn,d r:o orgc.nization for technical intelligcnc"'
at the beginning of' tho wn.r. At first tho US relied upon British an.i
Australians but soon realized tho inportance of technical intelligence
and began to dovo1op ~n org~nizntion. Objoctivos wore defined ond systems
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of evacuating and reporting captured enemy equipment were developed. A di•
recting authority was established at the War Department level and the chiefs
of the technical services charged with the production of intelligence on
enemy equipment based upon each service's responsibility for similar US
items.
b. Operation 0£ technical intelligence units ~ea~me ~ theater
responsibility, which, after initial experience in North Africa, was
handled in a different manner by each theater• In all theaters it was
soon realized that technical intelligence had an immediate combat
intelligence application as well as a research and development application.
In the ETO teams generally were under technical service opcr&tional
control and liaison \""las mainta_ined with the intelligence of.ficors by the
teams engaged in .field collection. In the Pacific teams w0ro generally
under intolligenco control and the operating teams maintained liasion
with technical services' staf£ officer. It was £ound by technical
intelligence units operating in the Paci.fie that a technical intelligence
officer to coordinate activities in tho field was highly desirable.

c. Demobilization resulted in the loss of tho physical structure
of the technical intelligence organization,. but tho objectives and general
principlos had been well establish~d.
SECTION II

CONDUCT OF II£TRUCTION
l.

TYPE

2.

TD.1E ALLOI'TED:

OF CLASS: ·Conference.
One hundred t~n' (110) minutes.

SECTION III
ADMINISTRAr.IVE DETAIIS
l.

REFER.ENGE N.tATERIAIS :

Study Student Summary, I-2906.

u.

Required:

b.

Supplemental:

eu.ss:.

None.
Student Surmnary I-2906.

2.

BRING TO

3.

UNIFORM:

4.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS;'

Unif'orm of' tho day.

"None.
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